ISI has taken over GHQ
The army was constitutionally mandated to be an arm of the
Pakistan state with elected civilians in control of the executive. But
it has seized the commanding heights and subordinated the other organs
of the state to its own unaccountable purposes.
In recent times,
however, something even more sinister has been happening. This is the
creeping growth of the ISI from a small arms-length intelligence
directorate or department of the military (Inter Services Intelligence
Directorate) in the initial decades of independent Pakistan to an
omnipotent and invisible "deep state within the state" that now controls
both military strategy and civilian policy.
General Pervez
Musharraf's unprecedented appointment of General Ashfaq Kayani, a former
DG-ISI, as COAS was the first step in this direction. The second was
General Kayani's own decision to routinely rotate senior and serving ISI
officers to positions of command and control in the army and
vice-versa, coupled with his insistence on handpicking the DGISI and
extending his service. Together, these decisions reflect a harsh new
reality. The ISI has walked into GHQ and seized command and control of
the armed forces.
This is a deeply troubling development because
it violates the established norm-policy of all militaries in democratic
societies - intelligence services must consciously be kept at arms
length from GHQ because "field commanders must not get contaminated" or
tainted by cloak and dagger operations in grey zones. That is why COAS
Gen Zia ul Haq kicked Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman, DGISI, upstairs to CJOSC
rather than give him troops to command. That is why COAS Gen Asif Nawaz
sidelined DGISI Gen Asad Durrani as IG Training and Evaluation. That is
why COAS Gen Waheed Kakar prematurely retired Gen Durrani from service
for playing politics in GHQ and then recommended Gen Jehangir Karamat as
his successor rather than his close confidante and former DGISI Gen
Javed Ashraf Qazi. Indeed, that is why the CIA, RAW, MI6, KGB, MOSSAD
etc remain under full civilian operations and control even though
soldiers may be seconded to them or head them occasionally.
The
ISI's meteoric rise in the 1980s is well documented. It became the
official conduit for tens of billions of dollars of arms and slush funds
from the US and Saudi Arabia to the Mujahideen against the Soviets in
Afghanistan. Three serving generals of the time were billed as "the
richest and most powerful generals in the world" by Time magazine in
1986. Two of them, Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman and Gen Hameed Gul were in
turn DGs-ISI while the third, General Fazle Haq, was the Peshawar
gatekeeper to Afghanistan.
Three Prime Ministers have fallen
victim to the ISI. PM Junejo ran afoul of DGs ISI Gen Hameed Gul and Gen
Akhtar Abdul Rehman over the Ojhri Camp disaster. Benazir Bhutto was
undermined by DGs ISI Gen Gul and General Asad Durrani. And Nawaz Sharif
by DG ISI Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi and COAS Gen Waheed Kakar. Indeed, Mr
Sharif might have survived in 1999 if Gen Musharraf had not earlier
cunningly moved Gen Mohammad Aziz from the ISI to GHQ as CGS because it
was the latter who nudged Corps Commander Pindi Gen Mahmood Ahmed to
execute the coup in the absence of Gen Musharraf.
The ISI's
creeping coup - ISI officers returning to command positions in the army -
against GHQ is fraught with problems. It has eroded the credibility and
capacity of both the current DG ISI and COAS within the military and
civil society. The ISI's spectacular failures (BB's assassination,
Mumbai, Raymond Davis case, missing persons, Memogate, Mehrangate,
Abbotabad, Saleem Shehzad, Get-Zardari, etc) can all be laid at GHQ's
door just as the ISI's anti-terrorist policy failures are responsible
for the loss of over 3000 soldiers to the Pakistan Taliban and the
terrorist attacks on GHQ and Mehran Navy Base. The fact that both the
COAS and DG ISI have taken extensions in service has also undermined
their credibility far and wide.
This is a critical point in
Pakistan's political history. On the one hand, the civilians all agree
that the military should be subservient to civilian authority, that the
national security state must be replaced by a social welfare state and
that peace and trade rather than war and aid paradigms should prevail in
security policies without friends or enemies. On the other side, the
military high command is more lacking in credibility now than at any
time since 1971. Meanwhile, the judiciary and media have broken free
from the stranglehold of the civilian executive and military command and
want to hold both accountable.
A Truth and Reconciliation
Commission is desperately needed as in much of Latin America and Africa
to hold errant civilians, soldiers and intelligence operators
accountable. The ISI's internal political wing must be abolished and it
must be brought under civilian authority. GHQ must follow security
policies made on meaningful advice from civilians. And civilians should
join hands to fashion a new national welfare state for the people of
Pakistan.
In : Najam Sethi
Notes