Obama’s Af-Pak strategy: tossing away the COIN
In his speech on June 22, 2011, Barack
Obama outlined the drawdown of the US forces from Afghanistan. He
declared his plans to pull out 10,000 troops from Afghanistan at the
year’s end and another 23,000 by mid-2012, essentially withdrawing all
troops inducted during the 2009 surge. Obama pledged the drawdown at a
steady pace until the transition of security to the Afghan authorities
by 2014.
The deliberations leading to his decision, including the
stance of his various advisors, congressional hearings after the speech
and indeed sections of the speech itself hint towards what lies ahead
in the Pak-Afghan region, not only in the next two years but also after
2014. When it came to selling Obama’s plan to the congressional leaders,
the Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, ‘excused’ himself and was
represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen,
who conceded before the House Armed Services Committee that he had hoped
for a slower pace of withdrawal. Mullen had described the plan as more
aggressive and riskier than he was originally prepared to accept.
Similarly,
General David Petraeus and the man set to replace him as head of
coalition forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General John Allen, have
stated that Obama’s final plan was not one of the options proposed to
the president by General Petraeus. Except for Hillary Clinton and Joe
Biden, most officials have placed their dissenting note on record.
Nonetheless, the US brass has closed ranks behind Obama and seem to have
taken ownership of the task he has assigned them.
From the
Pakistani perspective, there are multiple indicators pointing towards
things heating up for them in the near future. Most importantly, Obama
stated in his speech: “Of course, our efforts must also address
terrorist safe havens in Pakistan. No country is more endangered by the
presence of violent extremists, which is why we will continue to press
Pakistan to expand its participation in securing a more peaceful future
for this war torn region. We will work with the Pakistani government to
root out the cancer of violent extremism, and we will insist that it
keep its commitments. For there should be no doubt that so long as I am
president, the US will never tolerate a safe haven for those who aim to
kill us. They cannot elude us, nor escape the justice they deserve.”
While the US military commanders may have differed on the pace of
drawdown from Afghanistan, it is this aspect of his plan that they
totally concur with.
On June 28, 2011, at the US Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, General Allen and Vice Admiral William
McRaven — the Obama nominee to head US Special Operations Command — were
quite candid, not just about Obama’s overall plan, but the aspects of
it that deal directly with Pakistan. In response to Senator Carl Levin’s
question about Pakistan’s attitude vis-à-vis the militants, especially
the Haqqani network, Admiral McRaven bluntly noted that he did not
expect any change in Pakistan’s approach towards these proxies because
it was “both a capacity issue for the Pakistanis and...a willingness
issue”. More ominously, when asked by Senator Bob Graham: “Do we believe
Mullah Omar is there with the knowledge of the ISI and the upper
echelons of the army?” McRaven responded, “Sir, I believe the Pakistanis
know he is in Pakistan.”
Where does this leave us, or more
importantly, lead us? As much as Obama has a visceral dislike for war
and, unlike George W Bush, is not trigger-happy, he has made up his mind
that he will not be gun shy when it comes to enforcing the key elements
of his plan to end the war in Afghanistan, which means tossing away the
counterinsurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan, in favour of a
counter-terrorism effort along the Durand Line. Buoyed by the results of
the hunt for Osama bin Laden, Obama will not reinvent the wheel and
intends to apply the same model for both the Haqqani network and the
‘irreconcilable’ Afghan Taliban. The primary US focus will now be on the
Pakistan-supported insurgents.
Contrarily, Pakistan is tempted
to wait out the US and may overplay its hand while trying to hedge its
bets in Afghanistan. The inaction against the militant safe havens in
North Waziristan (NW) and the talk about military action in the Kurram
Agency suggest no course correction on the part of Pakistan. Reports
from Upper Kurram state that the locals are being asked by Pakistani
security agencies to disarm, effectively leaving them at the mercy of
the Haqqani network and its affiliates. It is unlikely that the Turi and
Bangash tribes will disarm and become sitting ducks for the jihadists.
The chaos that can ensue, including massive internal displacement of
people, provides an opportunity for the Pakistani establishment to
retract and hide its proxies in the affected areas, as they become more
vulnerable in NW and along the Durand Line.
The Pakistani
planners apparently lauded the UN separation of the Taliban and al Qaeda
on the sanctions blacklist. The move, obviously designed to pry away
the Taliban from Pakistan and nudge them towards the peace process, has
other key implications, which Pakistan apparently has overlooked. This
distinction does not necessarily mean lifting the sanctions; it in fact
sets the stage for further sanctions against al Qaeda-affiliated
terrorists, especially the India-oriented Punjabi jihadist groups based
in Pakistan’s heartland. Adding to this calculus an extremely likely
presence of about 25,000 US troops in at least three bases in Kandahar,
Kabul and Bagram after 2014 makes the US withdrawal different from the
Soviet pullout from Afghanistan that left the field wide open for
Pakistani interference.
While the Pakistanis are celebrating the
results of the Pew centre poll, which highlights a very unfavourable
Pakistani opinion of the US (and a favourable view of anti-US
politicians), they seem to ignore that, as far as Capitol Hill goes, the
feeling is almost mutual. Unless Pakistan is taking a considered
decision to remain on a collision course with the rest of the world, it
is time for its leaders to do some serious soul searching. Shuffling the
jihadist deck and hiding chips is not a realistic option. Maybe
Pakistan’s one-man diplomatic army in DC, Ambassador Husain Haqqani can
talk some sense into Pakistan’s civil and military leadership. While he
has successfully persuaded Mullen and Clinton to play ball with
Pakistan, one doubts that in a world of Kashmir elections and MQM’s
revolving door politics, even he would be listened to in Pakistan.
The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com
In : Dr Mohammad Taqi
Notes